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THE EFFECT IN PHILADELPHIA OF PENNSYLVANIA'S INCREASED PENALTIES
FOR RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE*
BARRY SCHWARTZ
Mr. Schwartz is a graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania, working for a Ph.D. in
sociology. While concentrating in criminology he has also published in the area of social psychology.
He received his Bachelor's degree from Temple University and his Master's from the University of
Maryland.
In an attempt to evaluate the deterrent effect of Pennsylvania's increased penalties for rape
the author subjects annual rape frequencies to regression-discontinuity analysis and also compares
monthly variation in the seriousness and volume of rape. The analysis shows that neither the excite-
ment leading up to the imposition of stronger penalties nor the actual imposition of such penalties
affected the frequency or seriousness of rape in Philadelphia.
This paper is a revised version of a paper prepared in a seminar conducted by Professor Thorsten
Sellin
BACKGROUND
The Palm Sunday rape. On April 3rd, 1966, at
approximately 3:00 a.m., three Negro men broke
into a West Philadelphia home occupied by an
eighty-year-old widow, her forty-four-year old
daughter and fourteen-year-old granddaughter.
During a period of forty minutes, the intruders
viciously beat up and raped both women and the
child, ransacked and looted the home. The grand-
mother was found unconscious by the police and
lying in a pool of blood. The mother and daughter
were hysterical. Each of the three victims was
ferociously dragged and thrown about (the four-
teen-year old had been pulled across the floor by
her hair); the upstairs and downstairs were spat-
tered with blood. The grandmother later died
from her wounds.'
On April 14, after considerable public outrage
(expressed most forcefully in The Philadelphia
Inquirer), an end was put to all continuances on
trials for those accused of crimes leading to bodily
injury. This administrative shift was justified in
terms of its deterrent value by one of Philadel-
phia's leading jurists:
"Let the word go out loud and clear to the
lawless element in the city of Philadelphia that
the arrest for any crime of violence will result in
speedy arraignment and trial. Such action should
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to
former Commissioner of Police Edward J. Bell for
placing needed police data at his disposal. He is also
indebted to the staff of the Research and Planning
Division of the Philadelphia Police Department for
their assistance.
I The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 4, 1966, pp. 1;
31. The grandmother died on April 22, 1966.
serve not only to remove those convicted of such
crimes in our community but-perhaps of equal im-
portance-to deter others who might be so in-
clined."'
The District Attorney in Philadelphia ap-
plauded the new policy. "Once the pattern seeps
down through the criminal element," he said,
"they will think twice... and this will bring
about the desired deterrent effect"A The District
Attorney did admit that "the people we're dealing
with in rape cases aren't quite as sensitive to
what's being printed in the papers as the average
public.... But it takes time to seep down ... even-
tually these rapists are going to realize that such
an attack is going to put them in prison for a good
part of their lives."14
New penalties for rape. By the middle of April
the Palm Sunday Rape in West Philadelphia had
become a cause cgbre throughout the state.
Legislators began to speak of doubling the existing
penalties. On Monday, April 18th the Senate, in
special legislative session, voted 48-0 for a bill
which doubled the 15 year maximum sentence
and provided for a $10,000 fine. This action was
soon scuttled by the House, which set forth a more
detailed and harsher measure providing for a
maximum of life imprisonment and a $10,000
fine for those convicted of rape involving serious
bodily injury. This latter proposal passed 202-0
after 64 minutes of debate.5
:Ibid., April 14, 1966, p. 1.
Ibid., April 15, 1966, p. 10.4 T Evening Bulletin, April 14, 1966, p. 1.5 The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 19, 1966, pp. 1;
37. The other House proposals that were defeated
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One legislator expressed the hope that a com-
promise between Senate and House could be
"speedily agreed upon... so the women of our
Commonwealth can walk our streets safely and
live in their homes more securely". 6 Thus, public
safety was seen to depend upon the passage of a
new rape law, and tempers were running short.
The Philadelphia Inquirer suggested that". . .the
maneuverings indicated a desire by both groups
to seize political advantage in the battle over
enactment of legislation in an effort to curb the
growing number of rape cases".7 Both the Governor
and Senate Majority Leader accused the Demo-
crats of exploiting the rape crisis for political
gain. After further accusations and counter-
accusations a compromise, modelled basically after
the House proposal, was agreed upon.s
On May 12, 1966, Governor Scranton signed
into law the compromise bill which amended the
Pennsylvania Penal Code of 1939. The chief
provisions of this new law call for differential
maximum penalties for rape and attempted rape
with and without bodily injury,9 and for harsher
penalties for those convicted of second and sub-
sequent' offenses in attempted rape. Perhaps the
most important feature of this act is the setting of
a minimum sentence of 15 years for rape involving
injury. (In Pennsylvania the law in most cases
only provides maximum penalties.)
The maximum sentence for rape with bodily
injury was increased from 15 years to life imprison-
ment. For rape without injury the top penalty
was raised from 15 to 20 years. The maximum
punishment for attempted rape with bodily
injury was increased from 5 to 15 years of im-
prisonment, and from 5 to 7 years for attempted
rape without injury to the victim. However, for
involved a proposal to introduce the "cat-o-nine tails",
and another to extend the death penalty to rapists.(Ibid., May 11, 1966, p. 32.)
6 Ibid., April 22, 1966, p. 7.
7 Ibid., April 26, 1966, p. 11.
8 Ibid., April 27, 1966, p. 6; May 10, 1966, p. 7.
Interestingly, legislators had no special preference for
either bill, despite the fact that the House and Senate
versions differed broadly with respect to both the
degree and structure of the rape penalties. Unanimity,
then, was no measure of commitment in either House
or Senate. The new rape penalties had definitely be-
come a political issue which both parties were eager
to exploit in the upcoming primaries.
9 Bodily injury refers to that which "creates a
substantial risk of death or which causes serious perma-
nent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any member or organ of the body."
(Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative Service, 1966 Regular
and Special Sessions, 1966, p. 27.)
those at least twice convicted of attempted rape,
the maximum sentence was increased from 5 years
to life imprisonment. The new law also provides
for increased maximum fines.10
Upon passage of the bill one of its three sponsors
(a state senator from West Philadelphia) de-
clared:
"The passage of this bill is a major break-
through in the fight on crime throughout the State,
and especially in Philadelphia, and will bring
about a definite deterrent on future rapists.
"When the word is circulated among these
vicious criminals that they will be swiftly and
severely punished; when they get the message
that our organized society will not tolerate the
violation of our women, these men will think twice
before committing these uncivilized acts.""
It is the purpose of the remainder of this paper
to evaluate the effectiveness of the increased
penalties for rape in Pennsylvania.
TnM PRESENT STUDY
The rationale underlying this investigation is
that the deterrent effect of thenew penalties should
affect the rate of rape and attempted rape most
forcefully in the very community in which the
celebrated Palm Sunday offense occurred. If the
new law had a desirable effect, a perceptible
drop in the monthly rape rates could be expected
after May 12, 1966-or even in April, the period
of greatest public outrage in which much well-
publicized planning for the new penalties took
place. Before analyzing the data we must point
out that only negligible changes in the adult male
population have occurred in Philadelphia during
the period of time studied.12 We may therefore
work directly with frequencies.
Rapes and attempted rapes in 1965 and 1966.
Police records of combined rape and attempted
10 For details of the 1939 Code and its amendment,
see Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, Title
18 (Philadelphia: Bisel, 1963), pp. 210, 227; Pnrdon's
Pennsylvania Legislative Service, 1966 Regular and
Special Sessions, 1966, pp. 27-28.
11Tie Philadelphia Inquirer, May 12, 1966, p. 42.
2 The number of males in Philadelphia between the
ages of 15 and 54 has remained very stable. For the
sake of completeness these estimates, which are avail-
able from 1960, are; 1960: 501,922; 1961: 528,100;
1962: 513,500; 1963: 514,700; 1964: 505,600; 1965:
524,900; 1966: 514,100. Sources: U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Characteristics of the Pop lation, Vol. I, Part
40, 1960, p. 243; Philadelphia, Department of Public
Health, Division of Statistics and Research, Population
Estimates, 1962-1965, 1967; Philadelphia, Department
of Public Health, Division of Statistics and Research,
Annual Statistical Report, 1965, p. 1.
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rape in the months of 1965 and 1966 immediately
cast doubt upon the deterrent value of the new
penal measures. This information is presented
in Table I.
It can be seen that decreases of 16, 5 and 20
were found in April, May and June of 1966; how-
ever, the increases of 21, 5 and 3 in July, August
and September disillusioned anyone who took
the former decreases as indications of the deterrent
effect of public attention and the rape legislation.
Indeed, the number of rapes taking place after
June 1st was 205 in both 1965 and 1966. On the
basis of these figures, then, no long-run deterrent
effect could be claimed.
Rapes and attempted rapes: 1958-1966. It may
properly be argued that the monthly distribution
of rape and attempted rape in 1965 was for some
reason or other an unusual one, and therefore an
unfair basis of comparison with the 1966 data. A
more proper method would involve the enumera-
tion of rape and attempted rape over a number
of years and the expression of their monthly
frequencies as a proportion of the trend (regression
line) that best represents them.13 This method
would provide a distribution of values for each
month of the year which are standardized with
respect to seasonal variation. Such a procedure
allows us to compare the monthly ratios of actual
to trend for rape and attempted rape in 1966 with
those of any other year. If the rape legislation
produced a deterrent effect we would expect the
ratios for the months following April or May of
1966 to be part of the lower tail of their respective
distributions. In Figure 1 the 1966 values are
circled.
The ratios of actual to trend in rape and at-
tempted rape for 1966 arefairly consistent. Through-
out the year values are found generally to be in
13 The values of a and b in this equation (Y = a +
bX) are Y = 44.065 + (-.075 X). Therefore, the
trend in frequency of rape and attempted rape over
the past nine years is decreasing slightly. The annual
volumes of rape and attempted rape over the nine
year period are:
1958: 556 1961: 500 1964: 461
1959: 642 1962: 523 1965: 535
1960: 529 1963: 460 1966: 535
In computing the line of best fit January, 1958 was
omitted in order to make the number of months an
odd number. This reduced computational labor.
This technique involves an examination of the
regression line with a view to confirming or discon-
firming a discontinuity at the cutting points implied
in the hypothesis. As such, we are dealing with one
mode of "Regression-Discontinuity Analysis." See
CAiPBELL & STANLEY, ExPERmNTAL AND QUASI-
ExERIuENTAL DESIGNS POR RESE uca 61-64 (1966).
TABLE I
RApES AND A=r=rrxD RAPES
1/65-12/66*
IN PHILADELPHIA:
Month 1965 1966 Difference1965-1966
January ........... 47 42 -5
February .......... 28 43 +15
March ............. 29 40 +11
April .............. 50 34 -16
May .............. 51 46 -5
June .............. 54 34 -20
July ............... 42 63 +21
August ............ 50 55 +5
September ......... 45 48 +3
October ............ 52 46 -6
November ......... 41 43 +2
December .......... 46 41 -5
Total ............. 535 535 0
* Source: Philadelphia Police Department, Major
Crime (Monthly Reports), January, 1966-December,
1966. (The 1965 data are included in the 1966 reports.)
the upper part of the distribution. The 1966 values
are only found below the monthly means of the
nine year period in April and June-and in neither
of these months are the values extreme. In all
other months, including May, 1966 (the month
in which the legislation was passed) values are
somewhat above average. If we compare the 1966
ratios of actual to trend before and after May or
June we find nothing unusual in either set. There
is certainly no indication of a decline in these values
after the spring months.
Incidentally, the data at the bottom of Figure
I enable us to evaluate the extent to which the
year 1965 serves as an adequate base against
which to judge the 1966 monthly breakdowns of
rape and attempted rape. The 1965 ratios were
below the mean of the nine year period in Feb-
ruary, March, July, and August. It can also be
seen that these ratios are highest not in July and
August as is the case in 1966 and for the mean of
the nine year period, but in May, June and Octo-
ber. In this particular year, then, seasonal varia-
tions were atypical. Therefore, 1965 was not the
best possible period to use as a base of comparison
for the 1966 data.
Rape and attempted rape: 1966. Despite the
fact that no reduction in the total number of
rapes and attempted rapes appears to have been
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Source: Philadelphia Police Department, Statistial Report, 1961-1965; Major Crime (Monthly Reports),
January 1966-December 1966. (Data for 1958-1960 are included in the 1961 Statstica Report.)
it is entirely possible that the proportion of forcible
rapes has declined while the proportion of attemp-
ted rapes has increased. Since these modes of
assault are confounded in the data published by
the Philadelphia Police it was necessary to con-
sult the Department's unpublished information
in order to break down these totals.
All forcible and attempted rapes reported to
the police between March 1, 1066 and July 31,
1966 were recorded. The justification for the use
of this particular time interval is as follows:
First, we have reason to suspect that sexual
assaults may have decreased between April 3rd
(the date of the Palm Sunday episode) and May
12th (date of the imposition of the more severe
penalties). Public outrage had been very well
articulated through the news media and may have
served as a deterrent. Secondly, such administra-
tive measures as the speeding-up of trials for those
accused of crimes leading to bodily injury were
explicitly imposed with a view to preventing
violent offenses. Our choice of data enables us to
compare the period of March 1st to April 3rd
with that of April 3rd to May 12th with respect
to the volumes of rape and attempted rape. But
the major claim is for the new penalties themselves,
which must be given sufficient time to prove
themselves. As Philadelphia's District Attorney
noted, it may take time for the news of the stiffer
penalties to "seep down" to the criminal element.
But if the May 12th legislation was effective one
might expect that a reduction in the number of
forcible rapes would be apparent by July 31st.
In table II we find the volumes of rape and at-
tempted rape by age groups within the time in-
tervals referred to.
Table 2 shows that the proportion of forcible
rapes by adult offenders has not declined. In fact
this proportion has risen slightly from .489 in
Period 1 to .571 and .500 in Periods 2 and 3. But
if we combine Periods 1 and 2 we find .529 of the
total to consist of forcible rape by adults compared




It may be yet argued that the new rape penal-
ties could have brought about a deterrent effect
by reducing the seriousness of forcible rapes. In
other words, the imposition of harsher punish-
ments may have no effect upon the volume of the
offenses to which they are directed, but may suc-
ceed in reducing their intensity. This possibility
was tested by drawing out the Police Investiga-
tion Reports on each of the 22114 cases of rape
and attempted rape reported to the Philadelphia
Police between March 1st and July 31st of 1966.
The description of the offense in all forcible rape
cases was then examined and scored by the Sellin-
Wolfgang Index.' 5 The manner in which the events
distributed themselves is shown in Table IlI.
It can be seen that the scores in Table III are
markedly skewed, 16 suggesting the median as the
appropriate measure of central tendency.
Clearly, the median seriousness scores are almost
identical in each of the three time periods, which
forces us to reject the idea that the new penalties
could have brought about a deterrent effect by
reducing the seriousness of forcible rapes.
On the other hand, the seriousness of a rape
may be increased by theft or damage as well as
by bodily injury. It is therefore possible for the
nedian seriousness of this offense to remain
constant over time while the bodily injury com-
ponent decreases. A rapist, in other words, may
not injure his victim by force of the more severe
penalties for such an offense but compensate (as
14 As can be seen in Table 1, the Philadelphia Police
reported only 217 cases of rape and attempted rape in
their monthly Major Crimes reports. The small differ-
ence of 4 created by the 221 cases drawn by the in-
vestigator has chiefly to do with administrative lags.
An investigation report, for example, may be returned
to the arresting officer for more information and not be
re-submitted in time for inclusion into the published
monthly report in which it belongs.
15 SELLIN & WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREENT OP
DELINQNuENCY 401-412 (1964).
"I Professor Sellin has suggested that in evaluating
the impact of crime control measures which have been
established as a result of or in repns to a particularly
brutal or unusual offense, the offense itself be taken
out of the data and not counted. The brunt of this
rationale is seen in Table 3, whose first column contains
the Palm Sunday offense. The seriousness of this crime
is so unusually high that it guarantees a reduction in
seriousness in the periods followoing tl one in which it
itself occurred. Notice, for example, that the mean
seriousness score of 15.18 in Period 1 drops to 13.70
and 13.24 in Periods 2 and 3. If the Palm Sunday
offense is removed, the mean of Period I drops to 13.95.(All means have been computed with ungrouped data.)
However, we may retain this offense in our data as
long as we employ the median as our measure of central
tendency, for this is insensitive to the extreme or
unusual values in a distribution.
TABLE 11
FoRcmiE AND ATrrmpsnD RAPES BY AGE GRouP
Or' OENDER: PHLADELPIAm, 3/1/66-7/31/66










































* Seventeen years of age and under; adult: Eighteen
years of age and over.
TABLE III
SmousNmss Sco~s or 113 FoRcrrnLa RAPES
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We find ourselves again compelled to reject
U SPES the suggestion that more injury was inflicted
IN upon the victim prior to the imposition of harsher
penalties than after. As can be seen in Table IV
the median injury score in Period 1 is 13.25 com-
Total pared to 11.88 and 13.24 in the second and thirdperiods.
The degrees of injury for attempted rape were
I obtained by classifying the data into the categories
'51 51 shown in Table V. Plainly enough, there is no
indication that the proportion of treated and
2 hospitalized victims decreased after April 3rd or
22 May 12th.
Before concluding let us remind ourselves that
3}7 the law now provides higher penalties for rapes
and attempted rapes which create "a substantial
risk of death or which causes serious permanent
5 disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of
the function of any member or organ of the body."
213 But it has not been possible to evaluate all of
I our cases according to this criterion-chiefly
because we could not follow up the victims who
2 had been treated or hospitalized. 7 For this reason,
the distributions in Tables III to V are probably
113 very slight underestimates of the true degree of
seriousness. (This is of course true for each time
12.95 period; the error does not, therefore, affect the
13.24 propriety of our comparisons.)
CONCLUSION
TABLE V
INJURY CLASSIFICATIONS or 64 ATTEMPTED RAPES
BY ADULT OPPENDERS IN PHILADELPHIA:
3/l/65-7/31/66
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Injury Group - Total
March April 4- May 13-
1-April 3 May 12 July 31
No Injury ............. 9 3 15 27
Minor Injury .......... 6 2 11 19
Treated ............... 3 10 13
Hospitalized ........... 2 3 5
Total ................. 17 8 39 64
Treated and Hospitalized
as a Proportion of
Total ............... .118 .375 .333 .281
it were) for this renunciation by stealing from the
victim, or by damaging her property in some way.
Thus, it is necessary to isolate the injury com-
ponent of the distribution of total scores set down
in Table IIL. This is done in Table IV.
We bring this investigation to a close by noting
that Philadelphia found no relief from forcible
and attempted rape either during the excitement
leading up to the imposition of stronger penalties
for these offenses or after the imposition itself.
This holds true with respect to both the frequency
and intensity of these crimes. We are therefore
bound to conclude that Pennsylvania's new
deterrent strategy against rape was a failure as
far as Philadelphia is concerned.
The inefficacy of the new legislation should
create much disappointment among those in
Philadelphia who had taken for granted the
deterrent impact of increased penalties. Of course,
the question of deterrence was quite beside the
point for those who supported the new legislation
for the sake of a more perfect retribution, or with
17 The recorded seriousness score of the Palm Sunday
event, for example, is 41. However, the eventual
death of the grandmother (not recorded on the police
Investigation Report) would increase this score. Other
cases must surely exist whose more serious conse-
quences are not felt until some time after their descrip-
tion and recording by the police.
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a view to the May primary elections. Whatever
their motives, however, legislators and other
officials are not to be held alone responsible for
the misguidance to which the Philadelphia public
was subjected. The criminological community
could confront the legislator with few compelling
arguments against his plans for greater and more
costly penalties. Very little is actually known
about the relationship between rape and penal
sanction. Indeed, the deterrent effect of criminal
law is a question which cuts across almost all
modes of offense. Writes Adenaes:
"While general prevention has occupied and
still occupies a central position in the philosophy
of criminal law, in penal legislation and in the
sentencing policies of the courts, it is almost
totally neglected in criminology and sociology.
It is a deplorable fact that practically no empirical
research is being carried out on the subject. As
long as no research results are available legislators
and judges necessarily must base their decisions
on common sense alone.""
This study is meant to contribute to the body of
knowledge which Andenaes calls for.
Is Johannes Andenaes, Punishment and lte Problem
of General Prevention, a paper read before the Inter-
national Society of Criminology, Montreal, 1965, p. 8.
This same exhortation was made by Andenaes more
than ten years earlier in his General Prevention-
Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. Cim. L., C. & P. S 176 (1952).
See also Thorsten Sellin, L'Effet Intimidant de la Peine,
4 Revne de Science Crininelle et de Droit Penal Comparg
593 (1960). The lack of empirical data in respect to the
deterrent effect of criminal law has also been-discussed
by John C. Ball, who presents a paradigm for future
research in The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and
Law, 46 J. Crmu. L., C. & P. S. 347 (1955).
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